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Abstract: As Russia-West relations hit a post-Cold War low and a sterner Western approach toward 
China has become more manifest, great power rivalry appears to have returned. It is often assumed 
that these developments will have important consequences for the durability of the so-called ‘liberal 
international order’. This paper seeks to clarify precisely what the liberal international order is and 
how it relates to English School understandings of international society and international order. First 
will come an analysis of these concepts as they are currently understood in recent literature, with the 
aim of providing a more wide-reaching framework for understanding hegemony and liberal order in 
today’s world. Then, the paper will turn to Russian and Chinese perspectives on the liberal order and 
the extent to which Moscow and Beijing are challenging it. Finally, it will discuss the implications 
that all of this holds for the conceptual relationship between international society and international 
order. 
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Introduction 
In the past half-decade, as Russia-West relations hit a post-Cold War low and a sterner 
Western approach toward China has become more manifest, great power rivalry appears to 
have returned.1 This has naturally been accompanied by a plethora of analyses evaluating the 
impact of these developments on the international order. It is often taken for granted that 
 
1 Indeed, the 2017 US National Security Strategy moved to embrace the logic of great power conflict explicitly. 
See (2017) ‘Trump: Russia and China “rival powers” in new security plan’, BBC News, 18 December, 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-42401170>, accessed 11 June 2019. 
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since 1945 – or perhaps since 1991 – there has been some sort of ‘liberal world order’, 
erected by the United States, that has operated uninterrupted and is now under threat. This 
paper challenges that assumption. It claims, inter alia, that the Western attempt after the Cold 
War to transform the liberal international order into a liberal world order – that is, to render 
the Western-based liberal order synonymous with global international society itself – has 
effectively failed. It seeks to clarify precisely what the liberal international order is and how it 
relates to English School understandings of international society and international order.  
First will come an extended analysis of these concepts as they are currently 
understood in recent academic literature, evaluating their shortcomings in the process with 
the aim of providing a more wide-reaching framework for understanding hegemony and the 
liberal order in today’s world. Then, the paper will turn to Russian and Chinese perspectives 
on the liberal order and the extent to which Moscow and Beijing are challenging it. Finally, 
we will discuss the implications that all of this holds for the conceptual relationship between 
international society and international order. 
 
Background 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and particularly since China began its meteoric 
rise, the idea that the international system is becoming increasingly multipolar has gradually 
gained currency. This is also found in the rhetoric deployed by major powers themselves, 
from Beijing’s calls for a ‘democratization of international relations’ to Moscow’s visions of 
a more ‘polycentric world’ (Kofman 2018; Wishnick 2010, 56). Even the European Union – 
supposedly the world’s normative power par excellence – acknowledges the existence of a 
multipolar world in documents published by the European Commission. The attraction of 
multipolarity as a guiding concept for understanding today’s world is perhaps reinforced by 
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the continued strength of the realist tradition in the study of international relations. Indeed, 
Russia’s deepening of its strategic partnership with China following the onset of the Ukraine 
crisis – itself brought on by Moscow’s perception that NATO and the EU were trying to 
enlarge their own sphere of influence eastward at Russia’s expense – represents a textbook 
example of balancing that would appear to vindicate the neorealist perspective. 
 However, structural realists also underestimated how durable American unipolarity 
would be. Neorealist assumptions dictate that other leading states would quickly band 
together to resist the hegemon’s overwhelming power. Contrary to this, however, we saw 
Russia and China remain focused on much narrower objectives throughout the 1990s, in part 
designed ‘to keep the international order from impinging’ at a time of perceived instability 
and uncertainty, with the scope of their challenge only widening over the course of several 
decades (Rozman 2014, 197). Far from challenging the order, we have witnessed non-
Western powers express a desire to play a role in upholding it. Indeed, as Marcin Kaczmarski 
puts it, ‘Russia and China see themselves as the co-architects of the international order on a 
par with Western states’ (Kaczmarski 2015, 134). Gideon Rose, for his part, notes that 
despite some examples of regional disorder, ‘[o]n the big-ticket items – great-power peace 
and global prosperity – the realist pessimists were wrong, and the liberal optimists were right’ 
(Rose 2019).Materialist international relations theories such as neorealism are – consciously 
or unconsciously – blind to the world of norms and are thus unable to distinguish between 
power and influence. Discussions surrounding challenges to the liberal international order 
have proliferated since the consolidation of the Russia-West rivalry in 2014 and the votes for 
Brexit and Donald Trump in 2016. In each of these instances, the global balance of material 




 It is true that the gradual rise of the rest has come at the expense of the relative power 
of the West. However, today’s world remains largely unipolar, with the United States still 
representing the only country that can deploy comprehensive power – economic, military, 
diplomatic and cultural – with global reach. Even the world’s second-largest economy, 
China, remains in many ways a mere ‘partial power’ (Shambaugh 2013). The story of the 
past decade and a half has been one of declining American normative influence more than 
material power. This verily began with the Iraq War, but gathered speed in 2008-9 due to the 
Great Recession – of which the failings of the American economic model were a central 
cause – culminating in the 2013-4 Ukraine crisis, which not only Russia but also China 
blamed on Western overreach (Lukin 2018, 52).2 At the same time, Moscow and Beijing 
have gradually undergone a normative convergence over the course of the post-Cold War 
period, largely but not exclusively in response to Western foreign policy actions (Paikin et al 
2019). Europe remains divided by rival normative visions, with Russia having been unable to 
find a way to integrate fully into Europe’s Brussels- and Washington-centric economic, 
political and security institutions in a fashion commensurate with its desire to maintain its 
status as an independent great power. In particular, the clash over Ukraine has demonstrated 
the incompatibility – at least for now – of the EU regulatory order with that currently offered 
by the Russian-backed Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) (Studin 2017). This, combined 
with the continued survival of the communist regime in China and the advent of a more 
explicit Sino-American rivalry, would appear to indicate that the liberal international order – 
if considered to be synonymous with the Pax Americana – has reached the geographical 
limits of its expansion. 
 
 
2 For more on how the 2008-9 financial crisis reduced American global influence in normative terms, see 




We find ourselves situated, therefore, in the realm of contestation over questions of 
international legitimacy and order, but more specifically within the rubric of an international 
society defined by an ontology of states. The English School of international relations 
naturally comes to mind, and since we are dealing with questions of hegemonic overreach, 
Adam Watson’s pendulum appears particularly relevant (see Figure 1). 
 Watson’s pendulum model seeks to characterize the degree of centralization present 
within an international order – that is, the relative amount of power and influence held by the 
leading hegemon at a given moment. This hegemonial authority is concerned not only with 
material advantages but also with standards of civilization (Watson 1997, 127). In other 
words, it measures both material and normative clout. The pendulum oscillates between a 
highly decentralized society at its leftmost extreme and a highly centralized one at its 
rightmost tip. Beginning at the left, one finds a society characterized by ‘multiple 
independencies’. One could indeed claim that even a grouping of states as decentralized as 
this constitutes a society, as recent English School scholarship posits that there is no 
distinction between international system and society – in other words, there is no such thing 
as a pre- or non-social system, as the mere act of mutual recognition is social (Reus-Smit & 
Dunne 2017, 31-32). This contrasts with earlier English School accounts, which suggest that 
states that are ‘sufficiently involved with one another’ to a point where ‘the volume of 
contacts becomes worth regulating’ constitute a system, whereas a ‘more intimate’ level of 
interaction that ‘goes beyond rules and institutions to shared values and assumptions’ 
represents a society (Watson 1992, 311-318). 
As the pendulum moves rightward, the degree of hegemony strengthens. Beyond the 
ability to limit states’ foreign policy options through impersonal pressures, we move toward 
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‘suzerainty’, in which the hegemon exercises some influence over other states’ internal 
affairs even though they retain their formal independence. Continuing rightward, we reach 
‘dominion’ – more of a supranational system rather than an international one – and finally 
‘empire’, in which the boundaries between actors almost begin to blur, producing 
distinguishable but highly subordinated political entities (1997, 118-120). The pendulum 
metaphor is employed because a rapid swing in one direction will ultimately produce a 
counter-swing in the opposite direction – albeit imperfectly, as the counter-swing may not be 
symmetrical. For example, Napoleon’s conquests represented a decisive attempt to 
consolidate a European empire – a rightward swing too rapid to be stable – which resulted in 
the forming of a counter-coalition and the eventual establishment of a diffused hegemony at 
Vienna (1992, 233). But indeed, after the Napoleonic Wars, the pendulum only swung part of 
the way back toward multiple independencies, as the Metternich order’s balance of power 
was diffused but featured an organized hegemony nonetheless (Ibid., 229). 
At first glance, this seems to characterize the situation we find ourselves in today, 
both with respect to the US-led global order as well as the European regional order with 
Brussels at its core. Following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
we appear to have witnessed a relatively rapid rightward swing of the pendulum in both 
cases. NATO launched a bombing campaign outside its traditional zone of operation before 
the end of the 1990s with Operation Allied Force in Yugoslavia and expanded up to Russia’s 
border in less than 15 years. The inability of the European Union to break from its Brussels-
centric model for the expansion of the European political and economic order led to a rigid 
clash with fledgling Russian-backed attempts at Eurasian integration, helping in 2013-14 to 
produce the Ukraine crisis (Studin 2019). The liberal international order promoted by the 
transatlantic alliance was only willing to incorporate Moscow in a seemingly subordinate 
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role.3 In other words, an inflexible set of norms promoted by Western powers have produced 
a pushback from the likes of Russia and China – a natural swing of the pendulum back to the 
left. The question is whether this provides an accurate description of the complex picture we 
are witnessing today. 
 
International Society and International Order 
According to the narrative put forward by Hedley Bull and Adam Watson in their tome The 
Expansion of International Society, one of the most well-known works in the English School 
canon, the international society we have today – a social realm featuring a series of norms 
and institutional practices between states – originated in Europe and gradually spread across 
the world, ultimately coming to encompass the entire globe. This proceeded in four phases, in 
the leadup to and then throughout modern history: crusades by European powers into Iberia 
and the Baltics, three centuries of exploration in which European international society also 
evolved, an Industrial Revolution that gave Europe the power to encompass and administer 
effectively the entire globe, and finally a period of decolonization that gave us the universal 
and global international society that we have today (Watson 1984, 32). 
Bull (1977, 8) defines an international order as a ‘pattern of activity that sustains the 
elementary or primary goals’ of international society. The issue is that, since the onset of the 
Cold War, international society and international order have not maintained the same 
geographic scope. During the four-decade-long standoff between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, one could make the case that global international society was governed to a 
large extent by two separate, rival international orders. Now, Trine Flockhart (2016) has 
 
3 (2019) ‘Good Read. Interview with William H. Hill, author of “No Place for Russia – European Security 
Institutions since 1989”’, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 18 February, 
<https://www.osce.org/magazine/412046>, accessed 28 February 2019. 
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posited that we are today witnessing the emergence of a ‘multi-order world’, featuring several 
(potentially overlapping) regional and transregional international orders, replete with their 
own conceptions of power, identity, primary (informal) institutions, and secondary (formal) 
institutions. This suggests that, by and large, international society and international order 
represent two distinct phenomena in today’s world. Indeed, one could even argue that the 
international society that exists today – while retaining various practices and informal 
‘primary’ institutions from the past – differs from the one that existed in previous centuries. 
European international society rested on a dual balance of power – material and societal – the 
latter of which was eroded by the wars of the twentieth century, driven by ‘universalizing 
ideologies’ such as communism, fascism and liberalism (Little 2009, 21-22). This left only a 
balance of material power, which itself disintegrated with the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
As Eric Hobsbawm (2009, 29) put it, ‘The dissolution of the USSR means that the Great 
Power system, which governed international relations for almost two centuries and, with 
obvious exceptions, exercised some control over conflicts between states, no longer exists.’ 
Still, one should not interpret this to mean that the post-Cold War era lacks any 
international society at all. As Tim Dunne and Christian Reus-Smit put it in The 
Globalization of International Society, their recent contribution to English School 
scholarship, ‘rather than seeing declining sociability as a marker of systemic politics, we see 
conflict and contestation as integral to any international social order’ (Reus-Smit & Dunne 
2017, 33). Contestation is seen not just as ‘incorporative or corrosive, but as an engine of 
international social development’ (Ibid., 36). The rise of liberalism with the French 
Revolution corresponds in many ways to the dawn of the modern international states system 
(see Teschke 2009). Contestation between liberal and illiberal powers defined much of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It should be no surprise, therefore, that this period 
corresponded to the rise, spread and entrenchment of the state – governed and centralized in a 
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way we would recognize it today – as the unit actor in international society (Tilly 1990, 103-
115). Indeed, Dunne and Reus-Smit themselves note that international society has not only 
expanded but also changed, with the norm of absolutism giving way to popular sovereignty in 
Europe in the nineteenth century and the legitimacy of empire collapsing in favour of 
sovereign equality in the twentieth (Reus-Smit & Dunne 2017, 29). 
This view is reinforced by Ned Lebow (2008, 58 & 506), who in his ‘cultural theory’ 
of international relations posits that progress is defined by an increase in the complexity of 
the system in question. Far from representing the onset of anarchy, we should therefore think 
of the post-Cold War world as being characterized by increased complexity – indeed, by an 
increase in the degree of institutional and normative content present in international society 
rather by the absence of such content, even if that content may not be shared and legitimated 
by all parties at all times. That is to say, rival institutions and norms may be driving the 
evolution of international society rather than necessarily leading to its total collapse, even if 
the society that emerges from today’s contestation becomes increasingly unrecognizable. 
This is very much in line with Flockhart’s conception of a multi-order world. 
 
Watson’s Pendulum Revisited 
We thus find ourselves faced with the question of where on Watson’s pendulum we are 
situated today, and what this can tell us about the contemporary international order. The 
advent of unipolarity following the collapse of the Soviet Union, combined with unparalleled 
American influence in terms of the perceived legitimacy of its socio-political and economic 
model, indicate that the post-Cold War period began with a rightward swing of the pendulum 
toward ‘empire’. As China began its rise and Russian power returned, however, it gradually 
began to move back to the left. The decline of Washington’s relative influence can also be 
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seen through the fact that Moscow and Beijing have begun to launch institutions of their own, 
including the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.  
A notable flaw of Watson’s pendulum metaphor is that it is mechanistic, assuming 
that any counter-swing in response to hegemonic overreach occurs automatically. This would 
appear to undermine the realness of state agency, which in turn would diminish the 
significance of normative rivalry between great powers in today’s world. Moreover, upon 
closer examination, it becomes clear that Watson’s pendulum does not take another crucial 
factor into account that can help us to understand the nature of the contemporary Russia-West 
and Sino-American confrontations. It is not merely the degree of hegemony exercised by the 
leading state that has regularly changed throughout history, but also the character and indeed 
the content of hegemony that have evolved, becoming progressively stronger as the centuries 
have gone by. This reflects Lebow’s assertion that change is embodied by greater complexity 
and increased content in international society.  
Perhaps Watson’s model is not blind to this, but rather takes it into account and 
considers it to be unimportant, as the phenomenon of left-right pendular oscillation has 
continued uninterrupted. Indeed, Watson himself notes that while ragione di stato in the era 
of the Italian city-states could be employed as ‘a justification of any policy’, Richelieu’s later 
concept of raison d’état more clearly recognized a ruler’s obligations to his ruled (Watson 
1992, 183). Thereafter, as the modern state began to consolidate, it had to transform its 
subjects into citizens to legitimate itself (Held 1995, 43-46). Unsurprisingly, this produced a 
rise in nationalism, which was strengthened when it became not just a political movement but 
indeed an official norm of international society: the right to national self-determination, 
recognized by the League of Nations, promoted by a rising United States and entrenched after 
the collapse of the Russian, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires. Both within and 
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between actors, international society and the norms that govern it have become thicker, even 
if that thickness is only occasionally universal.  
Moreover, hegemony in international relations has strengthened not just in terms of 
relative power – with each international order, bounded by two general wars, featuring a 
more dominant hegemon than in the preceding order – but has become more multifaceted and 
indeed rigid as well. The informal balance of power system designed to regulate great power 
relations before the French Revolution evolved into an agreed-upon mechanism in the 
Metternich system, jointly upheld by all leading actors. However, there was still a relative 
degree of flexibility in this order, as the Concert of Europe’s application of the balance of 
power principle often took the form of conferences, called by a great power only when it was 
deemed necessary. The ensuing attempt to infuse the international order with more specific 
content in the form of national self-determination after World War I was followed by a more 
clearly delineated, continually expanding body of international law and a more rigid, near-
cardinal norm promoting the inviolability of states’ territorial integrity after World War II, in 
addition to a ‘thicker’ and more formalized institutional architecture to regulate global 
economic and political interactions (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, GATT/WTO and various UN 
bodies). Going even further, especially since the Helsinki Accords and the subsequent 
collapse of the eastern bloc, the hegemonic liberal West has attempted to legitimate the 
promotion of human rights inside other states’ borders, with some success. The range of 
acceptable topics to discuss at the global level has gone beyond the strictly political and 
international, and now includes everything from climate change to public debt to human 
development. 
However, although the evolution of the nature of hegemony throughout modern 
history seems to have taken a largely unidirectional form, greater complexity in international 
society has brought with it the potential for greater contradiction. This is indeed precisely 
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what we have seen. On the one hand, in practical terms, the lines between states have 
continually blurred as the content and character of hegemony have strengthened. We have 
seen a rise not just in international integration but in international intervention as well, 
ranging from humanitarian missions to prevent mass atrocities to increasingly robust UN 
peacekeeping missions geared toward state-building (Karlsrud 2015). Sovereignty is 
increasingly tied to solvency, and at times even to political or ideological considerations as 
well, as the American-led invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime in Libya 
have most recently shown.  
On the other hand, however, the official legitimacy – that is, the nominally agreed-
upon norms – upheld in international society has become increasingly rigid. The legitimately 
recognized unit actor in today’s international society, particularly since decolonization and 
the collapse of European empires, is the sovereign state (Jackson 1990, 17). The desire to 
uphold this principle partly explains why great powers are intolerant of revolutionary non-
state actors or terrorist groups that challenge it outright (e.g., the so-called Islamic 
State/Daesh). If this norm were to be placed on Watson’s pendulum, it would be situated 
decidedly on the left, toward the ‘multiple independencies’ side of the spectrum. This places 
it at odds not only with the increasing emergence of NGOs and corporations as transnational 
actors, but also with the increasing penetration of hegemonic norms into the realm of the state 
in a way that redefines our understanding of sovereignty, such as the reframing of 
sovereignty as a responsibility rather than a right as per the Responsibility to Protect doctrine 
or the granting of international legal personality to individuals.  
This tension has been illustrated by Robert Jackson (1990, 78), who notes that – 
unlike in the settlement that followed World War I – the proliferation of sovereign states after 
World War II and decolonization was not rooted in questions of ethnonational self-
determination. This can be seen to have put added stress on international society, as it has 
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been contended by some that ‘endless upheaval and disorder’ is already required to 
implement the norm of national self-determination to its fullest, seeing as the world is not 
composed of ‘separate, identifiable “nations”’ (Kedourie 1984, 348-349). Jackson notes that 
many of these states are in fact merely ‘quasi-states’, juridically sovereign, but not 
empowered domestically ‘to protect human rights or provide socioeconomic welfare’. They 
‘are not allowed to disappear juridically’, enjoying ‘an unqualified right to exist […] despite 
their domestic disorganization and illegitimacy’ (Jackson 1990, 21-24). This produces a 
fundamental tension, not just for the political actors themselves but indeed in the realms of 
norms that govern international society, as quasi-states represent 
neither wholly the international ethics of rationalism nor of revolutionism but 
something ambiguously in between. Sovereignty can no longer postulate the good 
life. Instead, it is the basis of a novel claim to overcome the bad life. It is the ethic 
of progress within the juridical status quo: an anomalous sort of progressive 
conservatism (Ibid., 188).  
Watson himself acknowledges that the gap between theory and reality – between 
behaviour and legitimacy, as it were – has been growing for centuries: 
[N]ineteenth-century international society was pulled by nationalism and 
democracy and the growing importance of its non-European members away from 
the tight hegemony instituted by the Vienna settlement [that followed the 
Napoleonic Wars] towards a much looser attitude of mind that emphasized 
independence, at the same time as advances in technology and other factors were 
integrating the worldwide system into an ever closer economic and strategic net of 
involvement and interaction. The European ideas of sovereignty, independence 
and juridical equality, which provided the formal legitimacy of the international 
society of states in 1900, put that society de jure, that is so far as law and theory 
were concerned, appreciably nearer to the independencies end of the spectrum than 
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the operational practices of the system justified. This dichotomy between practice 
and theory was to grow wider in the twentieth century (Watson 1992, 275-276). 
The question remains how far this gap can grow before the contradictions it engenders 
a crisis for international society. The nineteenth century saw great powers contend with new 
nationalism and civic identities, even as rulers attempted to legitimate their reign through 
appeals to the dynasties of the ancien régime; the post-war era was marked by a 
strengthening of the norm of independent sovereign statehood, even as the character of 
hegemony strengthened as the world disintegrated into two superpower blocs; and the post-
Cold War era has featured rivalrous interpretations of American actions, promoting human 
rights and transatlantic security for some, while violating state sovereignty and consolidating 
American hegemony for others. What is clear is that Watson’s pendulum, while able to model 
successfully how states or coalitions of states respond to hegemonic bids at a given moment 
in history, does not fully capture the complexity of how international society has evolved and 
where we find ourselves today.  
To summarize: On the one hand, the pendulum model fails to measure the evolving 
character and content of hegemony – rather than simply the degree thereof – which has 
gradually strengthened throughout the centuries. On the other hand, it has difficulty 
incorporating both behaviour and legitimacy, which in any given international order can find 
themselves situated at opposite ends of the pendulum. It could be not just the rapidity of the 
pendulum’s swing at any given moment but indeed the cumulative evolution of the gap 
between theory and practice that dictates the stability of an international order. Therefore, 
while perhaps being able to explain why we have seen Russia become alienated from a Euro-
Atlantic security order that appeared to exclude it over the course of the post-Cold War era, it 
does not necessarily provide us with the big picture regarding what has come to be known as 
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the liberal international order. And indeed, what that order precisely embodies and 
encompasses is subject to significant debate. 
 
International Society and International Order Revisited 
Building on Flockhart’s model of a multi-order world, Richard Sakwa (2017, 44) has recently 
articulated a two-level conception of the global political system, distinguishing between 
international society and international order (see Figure 2). The top level features global 
international society itself, including all its formal institutions and informal common 
practices, while the bottom level is the realm of the multi-order world featuring competing 
and occasionally overlapping international orders. States and sub-orders within this bottom 
level interact with one another horizontally in the ‘sphere of international relations’, as well 
as vertically with international society in the ‘sphere of norms’ (Ibid.). Sakwa defines the 
liberal international order – essentially the West and its associated norms, institutions (e.g., 
NATO) and power structures – as being one of several orders situated in this bottom level.4 
His contention is that after the end of the Cold War, an attempt was made to render the liberal 
international order synonymous with world order itself, with the former adopting ‘some sort 
of tutelary relationship’ with international society in the process (Sakwa 2017, 42). In 
essence, the aim was to enlarge rather than transform the Western-led order, with the spread 
of liberal order being taken as equivalent to the spread of order full stop. In such a context, 
‘the goal was Russia’s adaptation to the stringencies of an existing order’ (Ibid., 18). 
 
4 A clarification is in order at this point: The model advanced in this paper contends that the bottom level 
represents the realm of international order, broadly speaking, in contrast with the realm of international 
society on top. It may take the form of a multi-order world today, although it could have taken the form of a 
single international order in past centuries, if one zeroes in on European international society for instance. 
Therefore, this bottom level can contain both international orders and individual actors. Today, it contains 
multiple orders led by individual great powers, as well as individual states (or smaller orders) with varying 
degrees of connection to each of these primary orders. For example, the EU represents an international order 
with its own set of norms and practices but is also connected to the US-led liberal international order. 
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Gradually, Moscow responded to this by adopting a ‘neo-revisionist’ posture, critiquing the 
liberal international order horizontally but defending international society’s autonomy 
vertically (Ibid., 47), which has helped lead to the emergence of a multi-order world. 
While not saying so explicitly himself, Sakwa lays the foundations here for an 
important contribution to English School theory. Unlike the Bullian definition of international 
order outlined above, recent English School scholarship posits a much closer relationship 
between international order and international society. According to Dunne and Reus-Smit 
(2017, 31-32), a ‘breakdown of international order is not merely a failure to realize the 
primary goals of the society of states; it is a failure of the rules and institutions that constitute 
that society’. Therefore, we can consider the evolving character of the multi-order world as 
having a fundamental impact on the stability of international society itself. If the various 
states and orders present in the multi-order world are able to develop functional relations with 
one another – rooted in shared understandings, agreed-upon rules, and perhaps even new 
interstitial architecture establishing links and governing ties between blocs – then we may see 
an evolution but nonetheless gradual stabilization of international society. However, if rivalry 
between major powers spirals out of control, then differing applications and interpretations of 
norms may cause the gap between behaviour and legitimacy to continue widening, hollowing 
out international society’s institutions and rendering them increasingly unviable. 
 However, Sakwa’s characterization of the liberal international order as residing 
exclusively within the realm of the multi-order world is a striking one. By essentially 
conflating the liberal international order with the American-led geopolitical bloc, Sakwa 
ultimately discounts the elements of the liberal order that have been embraced by Moscow 
and Beijing. He does note that Russian criticism of Western norms and interventionism is not 
designed to return the world to an era of spheres of influence and Westphalianism, claiming 
that ‘resistance to Western hegemony is accompanied by attempts to strengthen the 
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universalism represented by international society’ (Sakwa 2017, 49). But a strict separation 
between the liberal international order and the components that form today’s universal 
international society discounts the impact that the former has had on shaping the latter.  
While it is certainly possible to argue that institutions such as the United Nations owe 
their creation to the entrenchment of universal, rules-based multilateralism, Bretton Woods 
institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO have their roots in the Western 
alliance but have ultimately grown to become largely universal. Although it may be worth 
distinguishing between the liberal international order and the rules-based world order rooted 
in international law and multilateral institutions, one cannot reduce liberal internationalism to 
the contemporary Atlantic Alliance and its appendages.5 Indeed, liberal internationalism is a 
longstanding tradition featuring ideas concerning how to organize the international space in a 
positive-sum fashion (Ikenberry 2018), even if over time our understanding of what 
constitutes a liberal order has become ‘thicker’ in its conception, incorporating elements such 
as a commitment to upholding human rights. While the onset of the Ukraine crisis may 
largely mark the end of the West’s expansion and the failure to render liberal order and 
international society completely synonymous, the liberal order has still left its imprint on 
international society. 
It is therefore perhaps more useful to view the liberal international order as containing 
both a core and a periphery, with Western states lying at its centre but other players 
occasionally opting into some of its components. In other words, the order does not exist 
solely within the lower level of Sakwa’s model of the global political system, but indeed 
 
5 As mentioned here, this paper distinguishes between liberal order and rules-based order. Ikenberry tends to 
conflate the two, claiming that liberal orders have taken different forms throughout history but by and large 
are open and rules-based. This paper contends that an order being rules-based is not a sufficient condition for 
it to be considered liberal. The current liberal international order, in addition to possessing the notable 
characteristic of being rooted in American leadership, is much ‘thicker’ than being merely rules-based, 




straddles between the multi-order world and today’s rules-focused international society, with 
a foot in both. This is in line with Michael Cox’s contention that any liberal order requires a 
‘system of state power’ to underpin it (Cox 2013, 115). That system of state power may 
reside in Sakwa’s lower level, but the order itself is not confined to it. Indeed, this reflects 
Dunne and Reus-Smit’s contention that a close link exists between order and society, helping 
to explain why the rules and institutions of today’s international society appear to be in crisis 
following disagreements over the range of legitimate great power behaviour in the cases of 
Kosovo, Iraq, Georgia, Libya, Ukraine and Syria. The formation of orders in Sakwa’s lower 
level can shape the structure of international society, just as contestation and crisis in the 
realm of the multi-order world can have a destabilizing effect on it. What is the nature of that 
contestation, then, and what consequences can it have for the future of the liberal order? 
 
Russia, China and the Liberal Order 
Following the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s subsequent meddling in the Donbas in 
2014, Moscow accelerated its declared ‘pivot to the east’ (Bolt & Cross 2018, 12). This has 
led to a deepening of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, in addition to Russian visions for 
Eurasian integration. The latter have included a focus on Central Asia and the post-Soviet 
space by way of the Eurasian Economic Union but have notably also pushed for 
supercontinent-wide integration in the form of visions of a ‘Greater Eurasia’ (Karaganov 
2016). With the geographical limits of the West having seemingly been reached and a degree 
of overt hostility having emerged in Russia-West and China-West relations, questions have 
been raised concerning the impact this could have on the future of the liberal order. This, in 




This can often be a complicated task, as multiple interpretations are possible. For 
instance, one view is that Russia is challenging the order outright, seeing as its demands are 
clearly political – it does not feel well served by an order that has in many ways failed to 
accord it the place it believes it deserves as an independent great power. China, on the other 
hand, has benefited massively from the existing order over the past several decades, and 
therefore only seeks to reform it rather than overthrow it (Stronski & Ng 2018). On the other 
hand, however, one could equally make the case that Russia, having been fully incorporated 
into European international society since the eighteenth century (Watson 1984, 70-71), is less 
alien to any order whose cultural foundations are in the West, whereas China only began to 
interact with the West in any meaningful sense in the nineteenth century. Russia as a 
declining power could never be a genuine threat to the order, whereas a rising China in theory 
could. And if the existing order is rooted in a commitment to formal, rules-based institutions, 
then the supranational EAEU – modelled on the European Union – may appear to be more in 
keeping with its principles than China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which focuses more on 
bilateral infrastructure and connectivity deals. The fact that these competing views exist is 
evidence of the fact that the situation is complex – that the respective views held by Moscow 
and Beijing on the liberal order are decidedly mixed. 
According to many scholars, much of Russia’s international posture is compatible 
with the stringencies of the liberal international order. Sakwa (2017, 106) contends that 
Moscow is more interested in changing ‘practices’ rather than ‘principles’, guarding against 
double standards committed by Atlantic powers. As such, Russia should be understood more 
as a ‘norm-enforcer’ than as a ‘norm-maker’ (Sakwa 2011). Its foreign policy is ‘tempered by 
an understanding of post-sovereignty trends in international politics’, including support for 
global governance (Sakwa 2017, 132-138). In particular, the EAEU is seen by Moscow as 
being complementary to the EU rather than a rival to it and compliant with WTO norms 
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(Ibid., 147-150).6 Russia does not repudiate EU norms per se, it simply takes issue with the 
fact that its interests are seemingly not respected – as in the case of the zero-sum competition 
over Ukraine’s orientation in the leadup to the Maidan revolution – and that no autonomous 
role has been found for it within Western institutions (Ibid., 258). Its attempts to sow disunity 
within Europe are therefore merely tactical in nature, including, for example, its efforts to 
undermine unanimous support within the EU for the continuation of sanctions (Ibid., 269). 
In fact, it may be not only agency but indeed structure that prevents Russia from 
challenging the Western-led order in its entirety. Viacheslav Morozov contends that, having 
colonized itself on behalf of Europe, Russia has effectively permanently placed itself into a 
subaltern position – in both material and discursive-normative terms – vis-à-vis its European 
neighbour. Therefore, in framing its demands using Western concepts, Russia ‘does not 
challenge the Western-dominated world order in any radical way – rather, it claims a 
legitimate voice in the debate about how this world order must evolve’ (Morozov 2015, 22-
23). Even Russian Eurasianists have a Eurocentric frame of reference, as they are concerned 
primarily with separating Russia from Europe (Ibid., 90). That is to say, the country’s elite 
debate essentially revolves around whether Russia should be civilized ‘through mimicry or 
negation’ of Europe (Ibid., 157). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that Moscow is challenging 
outright the legitimacy of a European- and Western-centred order that it initially sought to 
join, having gone so far in the early 1990s as to discuss the possibility of having NATO or 
UN troops and OSCE involvement in areas of the former USSR that were dealing with ethnic 
conflict (Tsygankov 2010, 78). Moreover, in his speeches throughout the 2000s, Vladimir 
Putin was careful to balance criticism of Western double standards with rhetorical support for 
Russia’s transition toward greater democracy and openness (Malinova 2012, 77-82), while 
 
6 Some note, however, that the EAEU’s institutions are fledgling and its ability to boost trade among members 
is limited as its primary purpose is to advance Russia’s geo-strategic interests. See Dragneva (2018). 
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also indicating a preference for multilateralism rather than multipolarity as the nominal 
remedy to the excesses of a unipolar world (Zagorski 2008, 47). This suggests that the logic 
underpinning the liberal order has penetrated Russian political discourse on a systemic level, 
even if in a qualified manner.7 
One could criticize Morozov’s perspective by saying that it downplays the possibility 
that Moscow’s Eurasian and Asian foreign policy vectors have become meaningful to Russia 
in their own right, but other scholars also note that the debate over the extent of Russia’s 
belonging to Europe is so central to Russian political discourse that it is difficult ever to 
imagine it disappearing in its entirety (Neumann 1995, 210). Much of Russia’s foreign policy 
is guided by the imperative to be recognized by the West as an ‘equal and legitimate’ player 
in international affairs (Tsygankov 2010, 1).8 Moreover, it has been contended that Putin 
brought ‘an almost entirely unsentimental, nonideological, pragmatic understanding’ of 
Russia’s situation and international relations to the Kremlin when he assumed office (Lynch 
2008, 177). This would seem to imply that Russia’s conservative turn in the early 2010s in 
the leadup to and following Putin’s return to the Kremlin (Lo 2015, 24-25) is more situational 
than profound, in turn lending further credence to the assertion that Russia’s backing of 
Eurosceptic and populist forces abroad is more tactical than ideological. 
Similarly, China also finds itself in an ambiguous position vis-à-vis the liberal order 
and international society. On the one hand, some are quick to point out Beijing’s continued 
support for free trade, multilateral institutions and fighting climate change in the wake of 
Donald Trump’s election – seemingly defending the international order that the US appears 
to be abandoning. But it is equally possible to contend that China pursues these aims merely 
 
7 For more on the continuity of the Russian political system through the Yeltsin and Putin eras, see Wood 
(2018). 
8 One scholar contends that this phenomenon traces its roots back to early contacts between Muscovy and the 
Holy Roman Empire. See Neumann (2012, 25). 
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for selfish reasons, to reduce smog levels in its cities and to secure a favourable international 
environment to continue its economic development. According to some, China’s pursuit of 
economic globalization may not be to integrate with the rest of international society, but 
rather to pursue multipolarization, as increased economic development brings with it the 
ability to resist hegemony and safeguard one’s independence (Moore 2005, 134-135). 
However, China’s aims in this regard could instead be said to be more concerned with the 
supposed ‘democratization’ of international relations and the securing of global pluralism, 
referring ‘more to the nature of international decision making than to the distribution of 
material power’ and often citing support for multilateralism instead of multipolarity (Ibid). 
The nature and consequences of China’s vision of world order are also unclear. Beijing’s 
calls for a ‘New Type of Great Power Relations’ could be an indication that the Chinese 
Communist Party’s leadership has a genuine desire to shape world order in response to 
American demands for China to become a more responsible international stakeholder, but 
these could also represent a defensive tactic by a power with few official allies engaging in a 
bid to get Washington to respect its core interests (Bolt & Cross 2018, 15). 
Since the 1990s, China has also begun to engage with Western political concepts such 
as human rights and democracy, with one scholar contending that these ‘have not become 
national aspirations, but they have become legitimate topics for legal and policy debates’ 
(Wan 2005, 297).9 As such, China’s opening up to and engagement with international society 
have generated a co-constitutive relationship (Clark 2014), expanding the range of normative 
discourse within the country and helping to legitimate elements of the liberal order – at least 
partially and rhetorically – in China’s eyes.10 One notable China scholar has described the 
 
9 As early as 1991, a white paper published by the Chinese government opted not to challenge the notion of 
human rights nor its ‘universality in principle’. See Zhang (1999, 127). 
10 That said, recent developments such as increased surveillance of citizens and repression of Uighurs seem to 
be examples of this process slowing down, at the very least. Lebow (2018, 167) writes that domestically over 
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country as ‘quite risk-averse and narrowly self-interested’, a ‘confused and conflicted rising 
power undergoing an identity crisis of significant proportions’ that continues to possess 
‘contradictory attitudes’ (Shambaugh 2013, 309-317).  
Again, the picture painted here is not of a country that is challenging the international 
status quo outright. One scholar contends that China has emerged from a period of 
‘alienation’ from international society in the 1950s and 60s – a period during which it ‘did 
not regard or [was] perceived not to regard as binding [the] set of common rules regulating 
relations’ between states – and the process of de-alienation has required a change in China’s 
policies as well as global systemic changes (Zhang 1999, 17-58). Beijing’s transition toward 
a foreign policy that officially emphasizes peace and common economic prosperity has 
occurred thanks to its subsequent socialization into international society (Ibid., 101). As of 
the early 2000s, China began to acknowledge publicly that security has become a globalized 
phenomenon and assign ‘independent weight’ to interdependence as a foreign policy aim 
(Moore 2005, 135-52). This is evidence of a country that has reached some sort of 
accommodation with the political status quo, even if China has not fully integrated into the 
norms and institutions of the liberal order and will likely reject perpetual American military 
dominance of the South China Sea (See Kaplan 2014). 
Moscow and Beijing’s partial buy-in to the liberal order combined with their 
challenge to the unchecked dominance of the liberal West lends credence to the notion that in 
international terms they are not necessarily anti-liberal in their disposition, but perhaps 
merely conservative. This would appear to impose limitations on the extent to which 
international society can fully embrace a ‘thick’ conception of liberalism. Recent attempts to 
describe the outcome that will flow from these limitations range from a ‘post-liberal’ world to 
 




a world featuring ‘civilizational states’.11 As Matthew Horsman and Andrew Marshall (1995, 
166) bluntly put it, although perhaps presciently in a 1990s decade featuring Western post-
Cold War triumphalism, ‘The values and ideas that the US and its liberal capitalist allies seek 
to promote simply are not shared by the vast majority of the world’s population.’ If, contrary 
to recent developments in the English School canon, one still believes that there is utility in 
drawing a distinction between the systemic and the social, then one could perhaps claim that 
in a diverse international society of global scope, liberalism can function effectively only 
when applied as an international system – emphasizing most prominently a commitment to 
institutionalized, rules-based cooperation – rather than as an organizing paradigm for a world 
order that permeates the domestic sphere, featuring an inter-subjectively developed, universal 
commitment to liberal values such as democracy and human rights. Whether due to their 
material might, their sprawling geography, or cultural differences, it was always a dubious 
proposition that Russia and China would ever accept an effectively subordinate position 
within a US-led world order in perpetuity. 
 
Toward a New Conception of Global Politics 
It is common to claim that the liberal order set up by the United States in 1945 has continued 
uninterrupted ever since. This view is supported by the fact that international orders in 
modern history are usually seen as being bounded by general wars, with no such military 
conflagration occurring in the late 1980s and early 1990s. John Ikenberry, one of liberal 
internationalism’s most articulate defenders, claims for instance that with the collapse of the 
eastern bloc and the expansion of liberal capitalism across the globe, the ‘inside order’ simply 
became the ‘outside order’ (Ikenberry 2018).  
 
11 For example, Adrian Pabst (2018), Christopher Coker (2019) and Zhang Weiwei (2012). 
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However, the end of the Cold War did bring substantial changes, including in the 
realm of institutions with the creation of the EU and WTO, two organizations thought of as 
being strongly representative of the liberal order. Torbjørn Knutsen, who claims that every 
international order invariably goes through phases of hegemony, challenge and decline, 
suggests that 1991 marked the dawn of a new American hegemony and thus a new American-
dominated order (Knutsen 1999, 261). Other scholars have noted an increased commitment to 
spreading liberal principles beginning in the 1990s when compared with the Cold War period, 
suggesting a new set of organizing principles and norms on the international scene following 
the USSR’s collapse (Barnett 2019). And just as the interwar period was a ‘twenty years’ 
crisis’ bounded by two world wars, one could contend that the period from the fall of the 
Berlin Wall to the onset of the Ukraine crisis represents a ‘twenty-five years’ crisis’ bounded 
by two cold wars,12 giving further credence to the notion that the events of 1989-91 
inaugurated a new era. 
This new era, as we have seen above, was marked by an attempt to render the liberal 
international order effectively synonymous with international society itself. This attempt 
generated pushback from the likes of Russia and China concerning questions such as when 
state sovereignty can legitimately be set aside and who makes the rules that govern the 
international order.13 Indeed, their resistance to perceived Western overreach has at times 
even succeeded in preventing the establishment of new precedents and norms (Allison 2013, 
205). However, as noted above, this effort to render the spread of liberal order synonymous 
with the spread of order itself has left an imprint at the level of international society. And at 
the same time, the limited nature of the pushback from Moscow and Beijing – buying into 
elements of the liberal order and emphasizing their commitment to international society – 
 
12 Interview with Dmitry Suslov, Moscow, 11 September 2017. 
13 Indeed, Russia has at times been more preoccupied with questions of status rather than norms – with who 
makes the rules rather than what those rules specifically are. See Allison (2013, 45). 
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suggests the need for further nuance. Therefore, rather than the two vectors – horizontal and 
upward vertical – put forward in Sakwa’s conception of neo-revisionism, one can in fact 
identify three vectors that characterize great-power interaction and behaviour. First, there is 
the horizontal vector representing contestation in the realm of the multi-order world. Second, 
as Sakwa notes, one also finds upward vertical defence of the autonomy of international 
society, undertaken by individual great powers – either alone or in concert – in opposition to 
perceived abuses by other great powers. But third, there are additionally instances in which 
all great powers collaborate, conducting what is in effect a diffused hegemony, occurring 
through the institutions and practices of international society and exercised downward onto 
the multi-order world (see Figure 3). Put simply, great power relations are defined by a 
mixture of competition and collaboration. 
This enhanced version of Sakwa’s two-level model lends itself to – and can operate in 
tandem with – a modified form of Watson’s pendulum (see Figure 4). As noted above, 
horizontal contestation between actors in the multi-order world affects the pendulum’s 
oscillation, with Russian and Chinese resistance toward attempts at consolidating a 
Washington-centric global order equivalent to a leftward push in the direction of ‘multiple 
independencies’. Such oscillation between greater and lesser degrees of centralization around 
a hegemonic power occurs relatively regularly. But we have also witnessed a continual 
strengthening of the character and content of hegemony over the course of modern history. 
Therefore, one can conceive of a second, slower-moving pendulum that has – by and large – 
progressively moved rightward throughout history, in the direction of a strengthened 
character of hegemony, exercised not by one great power over others but rather by all of 
international society’s great powers over the international order. 
The downward vertical vector is the mechanism through which this collective 
hegemony is exercised. Unimpeded, it applies a rightward push on this second pendulum. 
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However, as the realm of international order gradually transforms itself into a multi-order 
world in the context of an increasingly globalized, democratized and multicultural 
international political system, we see individual orders and actors within this multi-order 
world defend the autonomy of international society by way of the upward vertical vector, 
which exerts the opposite effect on the second pendulum – hollowing out the character and 
content of collective hegemony. Contrary to Sakwa’s view (2017, 44), this phenomenon is 
therefore of a different nature from the question of polycentrism, which is litigated 
horizontally between actors and orders in the realm of international order.  
This proposed second pendulum is of theoretical and conceptual use for three reasons. 
First, it provides a model that describes the actual workings of the close relationship between 
international society and international order posited in recent English School writings. 
Second, it illustrates the partial nature of the Russian and Chinese challenge to the liberal 
order. The order may be facing critical challenges as a result of the return of great power 
rivalry, but this is due not so much to a straightforward hegemonic challenge as it is to 
processes that have been initiated within the two-level global political system. And third, by 
distinguishing between what Sakwa calls the ‘sphere of international relations’ and the 
‘sphere of norms’, the model proposed here incorporates agency, thus solving a problem 
commonly associated with Watson’s pendulum. Although a state may adopt a neo-revisionist 
posture in response to another state’s actions, the specific normative content pushed by the 
neo-revisionist state is not necessarily subject to those pressures. Therefore, rather than great 
powers themselves, it is the relationship between order and society that is subject to structural 
forces in the sphere of norms. 
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The post-Cold War era has witnessed a strengthening of both the upward and 
downward vectors.14 Discord between Western and non-Western permanent members of the 
UN Security Council has become particularly pronounced over questions concerning 
fundamental norms such as the nature of state sovereignty and regional ordering principles, 
evidenced by a Russia that is content to back the al-Assad regime in Syria if this provides the 
greatest chance of restoring order, following several examples of Western-backed regime 
change in the Middle East. However, Moscow and Beijing setting aside their veto in the case 
of the NATO intervention in Libya appears to show that non-Western great powers have also 
bought into humanitarian norms to a certain degree (Allison 2013, 201-203). Thus, great 
powers are defending their own interpretations of international society even as they 
collaborate in exercising a collective and diffused normative hegemony over the international 
order. We have seen not a complete descent into unmitigated rivalry, but nor has the liberal 
order become synonymous with both international order and international society themselves. 
If the continued exercise of the downward vector represents a shift of the second 
pendulum to the right and the upward vector of resistance pushes it to the left, then their 
simultaneous application could halt its movement altogether. The gap between behaviour and 
legitimacy in international society has been progressively widening ever since the nineteenth 
century. Hardened by this gap, secondary powers are now challenging the liberal order 
horizontally while pushing their own interpretations of what a truly universal international 
 
14 For instance, disagreement between permanent members of the UN Security Council may have become 
more frequent, with Russia and China exercising their vetoes more often in recent years, but the number of 
resolutions passed by the Council has also increased substantially. See Firestone (2018, 83). However, it should 
be noted that the downward vertical vector posited in this article is not limited to the functioning of the 
Security Council. Great powers also manage international dynamics through other formal institutions and 
various agreements (for example, the recently employed Normandy format in the Minsk process concerning 
the conflict in Ukraine). Moreover, in addition to formal (secondary) institutions, great power management is 
usually listed as one of the primary institutions of international society by English School scholars as well. Clark 
(2011, 63) notes that great powers ‘must agree upon norms for their joint exercise’ of hegemony, which aligns 
well with this article’s articulation of a downward vector representing the great powers of international society 
infusing the international order with content through the ‘sphere of norms’.  
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society would look like. Indeed, as Sakwa (2017, 43) notes, the aim of non-Western great 
powers such as Russia and China is to ‘universalize universalism’. Such actions represent 
evidence of how states may occasionally want to be rid of a hegemon while simultaneously 
wishing largely to preserve the system that took root under that hegemon’s watch.15 
Conceptions have already been articulated of Russian and Chinese foreign policy that allow 
for the United States to set the overall parameters of global politics but nonetheless aim to 
constrain Washington’s influence in their own regions without offering a bona fide 
alternative vision of order, ranging from Tsymbursky’s ‘multi-unipolar world’ to the Chinese 
concept of ‘one superpower and many great powers’ (Wilson 2014, 33). Even Watson (2006, 
111) notes a historical trend that ‘the structural lines and the general pattern of a system are 
likely to remain more or less the same when one state replaces another in the hegemonial 
position’. 
Moscow and Beijing’s desire to defend the autonomy of international society upwards 
through the vertical vector is evidence of their commitment to it, as they have indeed been at 
least partly socialized into it. This socialization has occurred in part through their 
participation in the joint exercise of hegemonic power downward along the vertical vector, as 
well as through the liberal international order’s expansion that has left an imprint on the level 
of international society – a society to which they belong. The result may be that international 
society possesses, to a certain extent, a ‘structure of Western hegemony’ (Sakwa 2017, 43), 
but hegemony is rooted in both coercion and consent. Indeed, the Greek word hegemonia 
implies a degree of legitimate authority, as opposed to the word arche denoting the exercise 
of raw power (Lebow 2008, 67). The salient question going forward is how much Russia and 
China will be content to exercise power jointly with the West, which in turn depends on 
 
15 For example, China seems to be focusing its long-term efforts on displacing the United States as the 
preponderant power in the Asia-Pacific region, but its desire to balance against Washington on a global scale 
appears limited. See Monteiro (2014, 142). 
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whether their defensive recourse to protect the autonomy of international society can be 
tempered by efforts to reduce the scope of horizontal contestation in the multi-order world. 
The answer will therefore rest in large part on the extent to which cooperation between orders 
is possible in this multi-order world, with profound consequences for the future of 
international society – a society which, despite the existence of differing values and norms, 
has become increasingly hegemonically thick over the centuries. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to modify models put forward by Sakwa and Watson to provide a 
‘big picture’ account of where international relations are currently situated in historical terms. 
In doing so, it has provided a more detailed conception of how international order and society 
are intimately linked, as contended by Dunne and Reus-Smit. Disagreements over perceived 
Western overreach – from Kosovo to Iraq to Libya – have prompted Russia and China to 
defend the autonomy of international society, which in turn threatens to hollow out much of 
the content of collective great power hegemony. However, Moscow and Beijing’s 
commitment to international society and their buy-in to elements of the liberal order have 
helped to ensure the partial nature of their challenge – neo-revisionist, but not fully 
revisionist.16 With a strengthened upward vertical vector reducing the likelihood of great 
power cooperation, the question remains how to buttress the foundations of the downward 
vector.  
As the liberal order straddles both levels – society and order – without fully 
encompassing either, the downward vector is exercised both through the liberal order and 
outside it. The various instances in which this vector is applied can be thought of as pillars 
 
16 For more on Russian neo-revisionism, see Romanova (2018). 
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that allow international society to rest stably. This depends on a solid foundation – the 
international order – as well as on stable pillars that rely on a degree of normative agreement 
between major powers. Thus, continued challenges to the collective exercise of great power 
hegemony and unconstrained rivalrous relationships in the multi-order world could 
exacerbate the normative contestation we are witnessing today and produce a crisis at the 
level of international society. Contestation might be inherent to any political order and may 
help to infuse it with additional overall content, but there can be significant consequences if 
much of this content is not universally shared over a substantial amount of time. International 
society will continue to exist in the sense that social interaction will continue to occur at the 
international level, but this does not foreclose the possibility that many of the contemporary 
international society’s norms and institutions will fail to survive. 
The challenge, therefore, is to find a way to stabilize relationships between blocs in 
the multi-order world while strengthening the pillars on which today’s international society 
stands. The first task could be accomplished through the development of formal and informal 
linkages between orders, including but not limited to new trade agreements, institutions, 
exchanges and fora.17 The second, for its part, relies on the liberal order becoming more 
flexible, finding an equilibrium between Western leadership and norm projection on the one 
hand and the need for pragmatism in relations with non-Western great powers on the other.18 
Additionally, when it comes to the downward exercise of hegemony outside the context of 
the liberal order, it requires greater agreement on the nature and future of rules-based 
multilateralism (Tocci 2018). That said, with Russia-West and China-West tensions 
 
17 For more, see Irvin Studin’s discussion on ‘interstitial tendons’ (Studin 2019). 
18 Lebow (2018, 68) notes that ‘[t]he most stable orders are those that evolve through a process of gradual 
change’. As such, inflexible orders can be seen to face challenges of resilience. 
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remaining high – on issues ranging from Ukraine and Syria to tariffs and technology – the 
near-term likelihood of such developments occurring currently appears to be slim. 
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